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IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD CO.,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No.

14,343

STERLING H. NELSON & SONS,
INC., a Utah corporation,
d/b/a MURRAY ELEVATORS,
Defendant.
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Plaintiff-respondent Union Pacific Railroad brought
an action against defendant-appellant Murray Elevators alleging
that Murray Elevators owed extra freight charges on eight rail
shipments of fish food to the Canadian government in Nova Scotia.
Murray Elevators answered and counterclaimed that any alleged
extra charges were uncollectable because of Union Pacific's
negligence in ascertaining and quoting the wrong freight rates
to Murray Elevators and in late billing of the alleged additional
charges therefor.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The lower court granted Union Pacific's Motion for
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-2Summary Judgment on the ground that under prior ICC case law
Murray Elevators was not entitled to assert any negligence of
Union Pacific as either a defense or counterclaim.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Murray Elevators asks this Court to determine that
the right to assert the negligence of Union Pacific under the
circumstances of this case is a fundamental right and that
denial thereof is a violation of Murray Elevators' right to
due process of law.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following facts are divided into numbered paragraphs for convenience.
1.

For a number of years prior to April, 1970,

S. H. Nelson & Sons, Inc., a Utah family corporation d/b/a
Murray Elevators was engaged in the manufacture of fish food
and usually shipped the same via railroad common carrier to
destination points both within and without the United States.
2.

On occasion Murray Elevators was invited to make

bids for the sale of fish food to the Canadian government.
(R. 42, Affidavit of C. Nelson).
3.

Prior to making the bids to the Canadian govern-

ment for the shipments involved in this action, Murray Elevators
contacted Union Pacific and asked Union Pacific to ascertain
and quote exact shipping rates and categories to Murray Elevators
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-3charges thereafter from the Canadian government.

(R. 42,

Affidavit).
4.

The reason for asking Union Pacific to quote the

correct freight rates and categories was that even with the
assistance of Union Pacific personnel, Murray Elevators was
unable to determine the appropriate category and rate for the
shipments because of the complexity of the rate books and
therefore was dependent on the proper selection by Union
Pacific.

(R. 92, Answers to Interrogatories).
5. At that time pursuant to the above request/

Union Pacific ascertained and furnished Murray Elevators with
the rates and categories used in the bids.
6.

(R. 42, Affidavit).

Murray Elevators obtained said bids and shipped

fish food in accordance with said bid quotes to Canada for the
Canadian government via Union Pacific and paid Union Pacific
the original rates billed by Union Pacific.

(R. 54, Defendant's

Memorandum).
7.

More than a year after said shipments Union

Pacific sent Murray Elevators bills for approximately $2,000
of alleged additional freight charges on 8 shipments to
Canada because the original rate quoted by Union Pacific had
been determined by Union Pacific to be incorrect.

(R. 43, 44,

Affidavit).
8. Murray Elevators was unable to obtain reimbursement from the Canadian government for the additional freight
allegedly owed.

(R. 43, Affidavit).
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-49.

Since the bids were given, several different

rates have been alleged by Union Pacific to be the correct
rates and the correct rates on several shipments are still
in doubt.

(R. 89).
A R G U M E N T
POINT I.
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF
THIS CASE, IT IS A DENIAL OF MURRAY ELEVATORS1
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW TO PROHIBIT
MURRAY ELEVATORS FROM ASSERTING A DEFENSE OR
COUNTERCLAIM BASED ON UNION PACIFIC'S
NEGLIGENCE.
The issues in this case are whether a shipper should

be allowed to assert the negligence of a carrier as a
defense or counterclaim and whether payment of lower rates
under the circumstances of this case amounts to a prohibited
secret rebate.
The history of not allowing the assertion of a
carrier's negligence by a shipper goes back to the late 1800's
with the interpretation of the original Interstate Commerce
Act which prohibited secret rebates.

It is interesting that

the language of the Act itself does not disallow the assertion
of a carrier's negligence.

The prohibition was one originally

imposed by the courts because of flagrant attempts to evade the
Act by monopolistic businesses colluding with the carriers.

One

of the most egregious examples of such collusion is contained
in Handy, et al., Trustees v.

Cleveland & M.R. Company, 31 Fed.

689 (S. Dist. Ohio, 1887), wherein Standard Oil Company had
been granted a preferential rate by the involved railroad of
$.10 per barrel of oil shipped.

Standard's competitors were
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-5All unjust discriminations are in
violation of sound public policy and are
forbidden by law. We have had frequent
occasions to enunciate this doctrine in
the past few years. If it were not so
the managers of railways in collusion with
others in command of large capital could
control the business of the country at
least to the extent that business was
dependent upon railroad transportation for
its success; and make and unmake the
fortunes of men at will. The idea is justly
abhorrent to all fair minds. No such
dangerous powers can be tolerated.
It is understandable that under the circumstances of
the Handy case, the courts would make sweeping and general
statements to prohibit the practice of secret rebates occurring
because of collusion between the large monopolistic shippers
and carriers.

Professor Isaac B. Lake discussed the problem

in Discrimination by Railroads and Other Public Utilities,
104-5 (1947):
The evil sought to be eradicated by this
section [Interstate Commerce Act, 6(7), 49
U.S.C. §6(7)] was the giving of secret rebates
on the basis of personal favoritism with the
sinister purpose of enabling the favored patron
to gain an advantage over his rivals. That is, it
struck at the practice which was the chief
reason for governmental interference with utility
rates. However, the Section is so sweeping as
to forbid any departure from the published tariff,
however harmless and however innocent in motive.
It is under this section that the carrier can sue
for undercharges made accidentally and is absolved
from contracts to give special services. The
courts have been obligated by its terms to
render judgments in favor of the carriers which
were grossly unjust to the recipient of such
casual and harmless preferences. The section
appears to be too sweeping in its condemnation.
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-6Here the passion for equality has lead to
unnecessary injustices and irritating
interferences with liberty.
As time passed the courts applied the earlier sweeping prohibition mechanically and did not look for collusion but
simply applied the proscription without analysis.

The rule

was carried to the extreme in Louisville & N.R. Co. v.
Maxwell, 237 U.S. 94, 97 (1915), wherein the United States
Supreme Court stated that:
Ignorance or misquotation of rates is
not an excuse for paying or charging either
less or more than the rate set. This rule
is undeniably strict, and it obviously may
work hardship in some cases, but it embodies
the policy which has been adopted by Congress
in the regulation of the interstate commerce
in order to prevent unjust discrimination.
As understandable as such application might have
been in the late 1800's or early part of this century it makes
no sense to apply it unthinkingly in light of today's economy
and especially under the circumstances of this case.

It is

clear that the judge-made rule of the 1800's suffers from
old age when applied in the 1970's.

In this case there can

be no collusion. Union Pacific is publicly willing to rely
on the old case rule and Murray Elevators is publicly willing
to defend itself.

Thus there can be no collusion between the

two and if collusion is wanting the doctrine of secret rebates
as a result of collusion is simply inapplicable and the old
cases should not apply to this action.

The rule was employed
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-7to combat discrimination against small shippers.

To apply

the rule in this case results in the exact discrimination
that was sought to be prevented by the rule.
In the instant case the reason for asking Union
Pacific to quote the applicable category and rate for each
of the shipments was because principals of Murray Elevators
had attempted to determine the appropriate rates but could
not ascertain the same because of the complicated and confusing
rate books maintained by Union Pacific.

Accordingly, Murray

Elevators relied on Union Pacific to furnish the rates and
categories.

In exercising its judgment Union Pacific was

aware that Murray Elevators could not recover any additional
freight charges from the Canadian government.
Under such circumstances it is clear that recovery
of damages for negligence against Union Pacific in misquoting
rates is not an unlawful rebate within the scope of the ICC
legislation.

Certainly the openness of the litigation process

is an effective check against secret rebates.

In the words of

Mr. Justice Brandeis, "sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light to be the most efficient policeman."
Cited in K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, Section 4.18
(1970 Supp.)
To prevent a defense or cause of action for negligence
against the railroad in this case would be to foster the unfairness which the law avowedly attempted to eliminate.
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-8In recent years the courts have taken a much more
open stand to require fundamental fairness in due process
questions to problems which had earlier been considered to
be settled.

In fact, fundamental fairness requires a closer

look by the courts at prior practices and legislation than
the court was

wont to do in the latter 1800's and early

1900's.
The situation in the present case is very similar
to a conclusive presumption in favor of the railroad.

The

only time that conclusive presumptions are warranted is when
they are based upon universally true facts.

The idea that

a misquotation of rates constitutes a secret rebate regardless
of whether collusion exists
is negligent

or whether Union Pacific

is akin to a conclusive presumption.

Under the

Fourteenth Amendment each case must stand or fall by itself/
because what might be fair under one situation may be grossly
unfair under another.

Thus to interpose the conclusive

presumption that the railroad cannot be guilty of negligence
or that a court awarded judgment is a secret rebate under the
circumstances of this case amounts to an unreasonable result
which has been prohibited in a number of cases including Heiner
v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312

(1932) wherein the court stated as

follows:
A statute which imposes a tax upon an
assumption of fact which the taxpayer is
forbidden to controvert is so arbitrarily
unreasonable that it cannot stand under the
Fourteenth Amendment.
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-9In the instant case where there is clearly no collusion
and the carrier has the power to set the category, it is
not simply a matter of picking the right rate but gives
Union Pacific the power to select a rate of its own
choosing.

In addition, because the rate schedules of Union

Pacific are so complicated and confusing that the ordinary
person cannot be expected to determine the proper rate, the
carrier is the only one who can determine the rate.
The irrebuttable presumption applied by the trial
court in the instant case is very similar to the conclusive
presumption struck down in Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441
(1973).

In Vlandis the State of Connecticut had a statute

concerned with residency requirements for state college
tuition.

Any unmarried students applying for admission to

state colleges and universities would be permanently classified as non-residents for tuition purposes if their "legal
address for any part of the one-year period immediately prior
to application for admission" had been outside the state.
Married students would be similarly classified if their
"legal address at the time of . . . application" had been
outside the state.

The Supreme Court stated:

. . . since Connecticut purports to be
concerned with residency in allocating the
rates for tuition and fees at its university
system, it is forbidden by the Due Process
Clause to deny any individual the resident
rates on the basis of a permanent and irrebuttable presumption of nonresidence, when
that presumption is not necessarily or
universally true in fact . . .
Id., at 452.
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-10The Connecticut statute contained no language
imposing a presumption, either irrebuttable or otherwise.
But the real interest of the state was in apportioning fees
on the basis of bona fide residency, so that the Court held
that a provision of law barring an inquiry into the question
of bona fide residency must be based upon an underlying
governmental objective which is necessarily or universally true.
Applying this test to the instant case, the real
interest of the legislation is to prevent secret rebates and
anticompetitive acts on the part of the carriers in collusion
with large shippers.

However, the courts have forbidden an

inquiry into the intent or acts of carriers and shippers based
upon a conclusive presumption that is not "necessarily or
universally true in fact."

This presumption not only violates

the reasonableness standard imposed by substantive due process,
but also violates the fundamental principle that defendant
Murray Elevators is entitled to have the question of negligence
determined.
The manifest unfairness in this case is shown by
the following:
1.

Union Pacific originally quoted the following

rates and amounts to defendant, who bid for a contract based
on those rates and amounts.

Union Pacific billed defendant

for those rates and amounts and defendant paid the amounts in
full prior to any "correction" notices:
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-11Ref. In
Record

Date of
Shipment

Number

Car
Number

R-138
R-139
R-140
R-141
R-142
R-143
R-144
R-145,
122

4/1/73
4/13/73
5/21/73
6/3/73
7/21/73
7/29/73
9/22/73
9/21/73

PO7062
P07333
P08239
P08427
PO9308
P09569
P10472
P16154

UP499388 $1625.39
UP508314 1386.53
UP500792 1635.00
UP497585 1635.00
UP500160 1734.68
UP490192 1482.00
UP507391 1482.00
UP507314 2036.16

Total
Amount

Rate

Weight
(lbs.)

2.66
2.64
2.18
2.18
2.29
2.47
2.47
3.20

61,105
52,520
74,740
73,730
75,750
57,570
60,000
63,630

TOTAL amount paid to Union Pacific—$13,016.76
i

2.

Union Pacific next sent to defendant correction

notices over a year after the shipments had been made and paid
for by defendant alleging the following rates to be correct
on the above shipments:
Reference
Car
In Record
Number
R-134
R-135
R-137
R-137
R-137
R-137
R-137
R-145

UP499388
UP508314
UP500792
UP497585
UP500160
UP490192
UP507391
UP507314

Original
Rate

Corrected
Rate

Amount
Due

2.66
2.64
2.18
2.18
2.29
2.47
2.47
3.20

2.735
3.025
2.53
2.53
2.68
2.84
2.84
3.30

$ 45.83
202.20
262.50
262.50
295.42
222.00
222.00
64.62

TOTAL amount claimed as undercharges by Union Pacific—$1,577.07
3. After this action was commenced the affidavit
of Mr. Barker for Union Pacific, R-32, claims that a third set
of rates were the true corrected rates for the shipments for
Union Pacific and that the total amount due is $1,856.85 and not
as stated in the original quote or first correction notices.
The third set of "correct" rates are:
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Bid
Rate

First
Corrected
Rate

Second
Corrected
Rate

2.66
2.64
2.18
2.18
2.29
2.47
2.47
3.20

2.735
3.025
2.53
2.53
2.68
2.84
2.84
3.30

2.78
3.07
2.61
2.61
2.74
2.92
2.92
3.25

Car
Number
UP499388
UP508314
UP500792
UP497585
UP500160
UP490192
UP507391
UP507314

Corrected
Amount
Due
$ 73.33
225.83
322.50
322.50
340.87
270.00
270.00
31.82

TOTAL amount claimed due by Union Pacific—$1,856.85
4.

In addition to the above tables, showing

various rates determined by Union Pacific to be the "correct"
rate for the eight shipments, Answers to Interrogatories
filed by Union Pacific, Record Page 89, states that there is
still a possible correction to be made as follows:
As a matter of further information, you
will note that the shipments referred to
in Interrogatories No. 2(c), No. 5, No. 6(a),
(b) and (c), and No. 7(a) and (b) were assessed
charges lower than the legal published rates
at the times of shipments. Corrections as
to these shipments will be made shortly and
balance due bills will be issued to you in
order to comply with Part 1, Section 6(7)
of the Interstate Commerce Act.
Murray Elevators was unable to ascertain what the applicable rates were for these shipments when it examined the
Union Pacific rate schedules.

It is apparent that Union

Pacific itself still does not know what the proper rates for
these shipments should be.

The confusion manifest in this

record cannot support the trial court's summary judgment based
on the fiction that the shipper is conclusively presumed to
know the correct rates.

This court should determine that due
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-13process requires that the court resolve the issue of collusion
and reject the presumption which absolves a carrier from its own
negligence.
£0NCLU£>.I0N
The denial of Murray Elevators1 right to assert the
negligence of Union Pacific raises squarely the matter of
substantive fairness. The rule applied by the trial court
is no longer a viable or justifiable rule of law and should be
narrowed to include only those acts fairly within the intent of
the Interstate Commerce Act as it pertains to collusive rebates.
Shippers using the facilities of railroad carriers should be
able to rely upon the rates quoted by the carriers so long as
such quotations are made in good faith and received in good
faith.

To hold shippers to the unintelligible rate schedules

appearing in the record of this case by the use of an extreme
presumption that the shipper knows the rates and categories
is a fundamental unfairness which should be corrected by this
Court.
DATED this

day of February, 1976.
Respectfully submitted,

Walter P. Faber, Jr.

David Lloyd
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY

I hereby certify that I delivered two copies of the
foregoing Brief of Defendant-Appellant to J. C. Williams,
600 Union Pacific Building, Salt Lake City, Utah
day of

84101, this

, 1976.
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